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I. INTRODUCTION
Using the initiative to rezone property in Hawaii has focused public
attention on ballot box measures to change land use regulations on spe-
cific parcels of property. The Supreme Court of Hawaii eventually de-
clared such initiatives illegal as contrary to both state enabling
legislation and the planning process it embodies. While there are some
obvious points to be made in favor of direct democracy, on balance it is
difficult to make a consistent case for the use of initiative or referen-
dum to rezone land. First, as the historical summary of direct democ-
racy below demonstrates, initiative and referendum have been used
primarily to make policies which affect the population of a particular
jurisdiction generally, not to overturn a specific implementation of
such policies. For example, both initiatives and referenda were used to
decide whether particular states or counties would continue to permit
the sale of alcoholic beverages, but not whether a particular distillery
or brewery should remain open or closed. By analogy, popular voting
on whether to undertake zoning or planning would be a proper policy
issue, but how that policy is implemented by placing a particular parcel
in a particular zone would not. As discussed below, there are legal
bases for this historical distinction as well.
This Article examines several of the more prominent legal and insti-
tutional issues which bear upon the use of initiative and referendum for
rezoning land. First, it evaluates the effects of initiative and referen-
dum on federal and state due process requirements. Second, the Arti-
cle reviews the differences between legislative and quasi-judicial acts.
While every state recognizes that only legislative acts are subject to
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initiative or referendum, they are split on whether rezonings should be
characterized as primarily legislative or quasi-judicial.
Third, many courts have recognized the critical importance of plan-
ning in land use decisions and the inconsistency zoning by initiative
can create. This Article discusses the substantive and procedural con-
flicts between comprehensive plans and initiative and referendum.
Fourth, the Article addresses the reservation of the power of initiative
and referendum in a state's constitution, and its importance in deter-
mining the validity of ballot box zoning. Fifth, the Article analyzes
direct democracy's discrimination potential, and criticizes initiative
and referendum for its insensitivity, if not downright antithesis, to mi-
norities on a variety of grounds. Finally, the Article concludes that the
process of rezoning by initiative is, on balance, seriously flawed.
II. HISTORY OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
Despite some common roots, the framers of the Constitution and
institutions existing at the time the United States was formed rejected
direct democracy as a form of government. Direct democracy survived
primarily as a method for adopting constitutions and their amend-
ments. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, direct democracy
resurfaced in the form of the initiative and referendum as part of the
progressive movement's struggle against legislative abuse. States used
initiatives and referenda, however, primarily for laws and policies con-
cerning the general welfare, and not to initiate or repeal specific deci-
sions applicable to specific individuals or property. Even the use of the
initiative and referendum to decide more narrow issues in the 1980s
has tended to avoid targeting specific people or property. Although the
effects of such votes often have threatened a relatively small group, it
gives rise to the sort of majoritarian tyranny that one of our founding
fathers sought vigorously to avoid in the eighteenth century. The spe-
cific use of initiative and referendum to reclassify individual parcels of
land through rezoning can therefore be characterized as inconsistent
with this history.
The latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed the success of the
American Revolution and the failure of the French Revolution. These
events were, to some degree, both the inspiration and the result of an
exposition of political ideas. The two countries shared ideas and influ-
enced each other in the formation of their new governments.'
1. E. OBERHOLTZER, REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (1912).
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One of the most influential philosophers of this period, the French-
man Jean Jacques Rousseau, strongly supported pure democracy. He
advocated a system in which the people assembled to develop and ap-
prove laws. No legislative act became valid unless ratified by the peo-
ple. Thus, the general will of the people was sovereign. Rousseau
viewed republics as corrupting the ideal of democracy.2
American pamphleteers, most prominently Thomas Paine, quickly
adopted Rousseau's ideas. Led by Benjamin Franklin, these American
democrats advocated a single chamber government and frequent elec-
tions. This system, they believed, would ensure a simple form of gov-
ernment with maximum citizen participation.' While this system
would nominally be a republican form of government, democratic ide-
als would be preserved as much as possible.
In response, the advocates of a republican form of government wrote
a series of pamphlets later grouped into a collection called The Federal-
ist. In it, James Madison singled out "factions" as one of the funda-
mental problems of a democratic government. Madison described a
faction as a group of citizens united by an interest adverse to the rights
of other citizens.4 Accordingly, Madison argued that democracies fail
to provide any safeguards against a faction routinely imposing its will
upon the weaker minority.5
Proponents of a republican form of government argued that repub-
lics contain in their structure the remedy for factions. First, public
views are filtered through the legislative body so that they are refined.6
2. Id. at 3. As one author observed, "Representative government with [Rousseau]
was an evil, necessary sometimes no doubt, but only to be tolerated, - never to be
cordially admired." Id.
3. Id. at 7.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 16-17 (. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1961).
5. Id. at 20. Specifically, Madison stated:
It may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting
of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in
person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or
interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communica-
tion and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Id.
6. Id. at 19-20. Among such devices or filters is the representation filter:
The true distinction between the "pure democracies of Greece" and the American
government," explained Madison, "lies in the total exclusion of the people in their
collective capacity from any share in the latter." It was this distinction that the
Federalists believed might permit our government to succeed where other democ-
racies had failed. The problems posed by majority factions were most acute in a
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When so filtered and analyzed, passionate views lose their force.7 Sec-
ond, a republican system allows for the representation of a larger
number of people over a greater territory. Consequently, more inter-
ests are contained within the represented territory which makes it diffi-
cult for an oppressive majority to form.'
The persuasive arguments in The Federalist led to the adoption of
the Federal Constitution. Once this document was in place, the states
began adopting their own constitutions. In 1778, Massachusetts legis-
lators finished drafting their constitution and submitted it to the voters
for approval. The voters rejected this version of the constitution and in
1780 approved a different version. This action was ostensibly the first
use of the referendum in the United States. The practice of submitting
the proposed constitution to the voters spread throughout the states.9
direct democracy. Placing the exclusive power of ordinary lawmaking in gover-
nors distinct from the governed checked "the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party, or an obnoxious individual." ... This was not a wholly naive or elitist vision
of representatives as morally and intellectually superior actors - although it is cer-
tainly not above criticism on either ground. The vision was a broader one. Its
scope encompassed the virtues of deliberation and cooperation.
Popular masses too quickly form preferences, fail adequately to consider the in-
terests of others, and are overly susceptible to contagious passions and the deceit of
eloquent and ambitious leaders. In contrast, the deliberative process offers time for
reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming
preferences."
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1526-27 (1990) (foot-
notes omitted) (emphasis in original).
7. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 4, at 21. As one commentator recently noted,
this theme runs throughout The Federalist. "If a majority be united by a common
interest," wrote Madison in The Federalist No. 51, "the rights of the minority will
be insecure." "[T]here are particular moments in public affairs," he opined in The
Federalist No. 63, "when the people stimulated by some irregular passion, or some
illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may
call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to la-
ment." Government must provide "safeguard[s] against the tyranny of [such]
passions."
Eule, supra note 6, at 1522 (footnotes omitted).
8. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 4, at 22. For an expanded and scholarly treatment
of this "filtering" process and arguments for applying extra "filtering" of initiatives at
the judicial level, see generally Eule, supra note 6.
9. In 1778, New Hampshire voters rejected the first version of their constitution.
They later approved a different version in 1784. Rhode Island voters approved their
constitution in 1788. Connecticut, Maine and New York followed in 1818, 1819, and
1821, respectively. J. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY - POPULISM RE-
VIVED 35 (1986).
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Not surprisingly, the referendum first appeared in New England, a
region with vast history of direct voter participation in the form of
town meetings. In colonial times, citizens gathered to discuss local
issues and pass legislation at such meetings.1 ° Given this democratic
background, it makes perfect sense that, with the formulation of the
United States, the people of New England sought the power of
referendum. 1
Subsequent to the adoption of the state constitutions, little interest
existed in the power of initiative and referendum until the late nine-
teenth century. Popular mistrust of legislatures best characterizes this
period. The people believed the influence of business interests, particu-
larly railroad interests, corrupted the government.
1 2
The Progressive movement was predicated on ideas similar to those
of Rousseau. Demonstrating hostility to organized government, the
Progressives advocated direct citizen participation as the cure for gov-
ernment corruption."3 Robert M. LaFollette, a prominent progressive
leader, argued that initiative and referendum were needed to protect
the general populace from the "allied forces of organized wealth and
political corruption."'14 LaFollette reasoned that initiative and referen-
dum would make it possible for the people, by direct vote, to repeal
"bad laws" or enact beneficial measures which their representatives re-
fused to consider. 5
10. H. HAHN & S. KAMIENIECKI, REFERENDUM VOTING: SOCIAL STATUS AND
PoLIcY PREFERENCES 8 (1987).
11. While frequently described as examples of Rousseau democracy, town meetings
also have been criticized as being imperfect examples of participatory democracy. Colo-
nial society was extremely homogenous in terms of race and class. Thus, town meetings
"merit description not as a public forum for the resolution of conflicting social views
and interests but instead as a community demonstration of consensus." Rosenberg,
Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice, 53 U. CIN. L. Rv. 381, 385 n.15
(1984). See also D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSI-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1984).
12. H. HAHN & S. KAMIENIECKI, supra note 10, at 9; Zimmerman, The Initiative
and the Referendum: A Threat to Representative Government, 8 URB. L. & POL'Y 219,
221 (1987).
13. The structure of the Swiss government influenced the movement's leaders. The
Swiss Constitution, while similar to that of the United States Constitution, differed in
that it provided for referendum.
14. J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 221 (quoting E. Torelle, compiler, THE POLrr-
ICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT M. LAFOLLETTE, 173-74 (1920)).
15. Id. LaFollette stated that:
For years the American people have been engaged in a terrific struggle with the
allied forces of organized wealth and political corruption.... The people must
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The Progressive movement led to state constitutional amendments
providing for statutory initiative and referendum.16 In fact, between
1898 and 1918, nineteen states adopted the initiative. 7 Moreover, in
1959, Alaska entered the union with a constitutional provision for initi-
ative already in place. In 1968, Wyoming adopted the initiative, fol-
lowed by Illinois in 1970, and Florida in 1972." Florida was the last
state to adopt the initiative.
The various constitutional amendments granted voters, through ini-
tiative and referendum, the power to legislate diverse issues primarily
related to general public welfare rather than specific persons or prop-
erty. Initially, these issues fell into three general categories: (1) taxes
and financing, (2) annexation and the determination of local bounda-
ries, and (3) issues of public policy tending to be highly divisive.19
The issues, however, have changed somewhat over time.2" In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, initiatives and referenda
focused on child labor, the eight-hour workday, women's suffrage, and
have in reserve new weapons for every emergency, if they are to regain and pre-
serve control of their governments ... Through the initiative, referendum, and
recall the people in any emergency can absolutely control. The initiative and refer-
endum make it possible for them to demand a direct vote and repeal bad laws
which have been enacted, or to enact by direct vote good measures which their
representatives refuse to consider.
Id.
16. In 1898, South Dakota was the first state to so amend its constitution:
[voters] expressly reserve to themselves the right to propose measures, which meas-
ures the legislature shall enact and submit to a vote of the electors of the State
[and] to require that any laws which the legislature may have enacted shall be
submitted to a vote of the electors of the State before going into effect.
J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 220 (quoting S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1898)).
17. J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 221.
18. Id.
19. These were issues of an essentially disagreeable and vexing character. The legis-
lature hesitated either to enact or refuse to enact a certain measure. Partisans criticized
the legislature no matter what policy it adopted. Consequently, the legislators then
deferred to the people:
We will refer this question to you. You elect us and we represent you. In this
matter we will submit the law directly to you and if you are in favor of it you may
pass it; if, however, you are opposed to it you will reject it. In any case you cannot
blame us.
E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 1, at 286.
The broadness of public policy legislation tended to minimize concerns about major-
ity tyranny because issues of general policy affect all citizens, or a substantial number of
them. Thus, a minority group or parcel of property would not be singled out for harsh
treatment.
20. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 69.
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morality issues such as gambling, prohibition, and prostitution.21
These issues dealt with general social and political reform that were
popular with the Progressives. They provided the divisive matters
which the legislatures preferred to refer to the voters, much as the Cali-
fornia legislature does today.
In the 1930s, issues tended to focus on social welfare, 22 such as alco-
hol control.23 In the 1950s and 1960s, initiative and referendum fo-
cused on civil rights and civil liberties issues such as busing, housing,
and the death penalty.24 In the 1970s and 1980s, environmental issues
became popular subjects.25 Although the specific subject matter of ini-
tiatives has varied somewhat in recent years, the general array of inter-
ests represented has remained consistent with that of previous years.26
In addition to the change in the specific subject matter of initiatives,
the number of initiatives proposed has increased. California represents
a prime example of a state that has experienced an explosion in its
initiative process. In the 1950s, while seventeen California initiatives
circulated, only ten qualified for the ballot. Only nine initiatives
qualified for the ballot, however, in the 1960s.2' But, in the 1970s, a
dramatic increase in the number of initiatives occurred: 185 initiatives
went into circulation, and 25 qualified for the ballot. By September 1,
1988, voters proposed more than 225 initiatives in the 1980s, and 41
qualified for the ballot.
29
21. H. HAHN & S. KAMIENIECKI, supra note 10, at 2.
22. Id.
23. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 69.
24. H. HAHN & J. KAMIENIECKI, supra note 10, at 2.
25. Id. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 69.
26. Id. at 74. Since 1898, the general subject matter of initiative measures has been
evenly distributed across issue categories such as health, welfare, housing, business reg-
ulation, revenue and taxes, and public morality. Id.
27. Price, Initiative Campaigns: Afloat on a Sea of Cash, CAL. J. 481 (Nov. 1988).
28. Salzman, Hiram's Folly?, GOLDEN ST. REP. 10 (Oct. 1988).
29. Price, supra note 27, at 481. The following quotation from Julian Eule's recent
article on judicial review of direct democracy starkly sets out what confronts even the
educated California voter on election day:
No one prepared me, however, for Election Day. Sometime in mid-October a mas-
sive booklet arrived in my mailbox. At first I thought it was the local phone direc-
tory. Closer examination revealed it to be a "Ballot Pamphlet" from California's
Secretary of State. Its contents included a staggering array of bond acts, proposed
constitutional amendments and statutory initiatives. The pamphlet contained the
complete text of each ballot measure (some running over a dozen pages in print so
small that a magnifying glass, if not a microscope, was required to read it), summa-
ries prepared by the State's Attorney General, analyses by someone identified as
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The increase in California initiatives3" over the past two decades also
illustrates a change in the nature of initiative.31 The late 1970s saw the
advent of an initiative industry, complete with signature collection
companies, computer mail specialists, and campaign consultants.3 2
This modernization leads to the observation that, at least in California,
the initiative process is "not citizen democracy because such campaigns
are run for profit and not for the benefit of the public."3 Thus, direct
democracy is no longer being used "for its original purpose: as a way
for an aggrieved citizenry to overcome a Legislature captured by spe-
cial interests ... [rather,] those same special interests have discovered
that by spending enough money, they.., can turn the initiative process
to their will." 34 This view is not idle speculation. California voters
approved only 46% (11 of 24) of the growth control measures on the
November 1988 ballots, and approved 57% (13 of 23) of the pro-
the Legislative Analyst, arguments in favor of and in opposition to each measure
written by a diverse group of persons chosen by some unexplained process, and
rebuttals to both sets of arguments, often by yet a different group of mysteriously-
selected "representative" voices. Even those able to make the major time commit-
ment necessary to trudge through the opus - the 1988 version ran 159 pages - must
have found the going tough. The propositions average over forty-five words per
sentence, and recent studies suggest that only those with a reading level equivalent
to that of a third-year college student could have comprehended the pamphlet.
Just as I was struggling through the state ballot pamphlet and beginning to won-
der how I had graduated law school with a reading level below that of a third-year
college student, the postal service delivered another ballot pamphlet. This one was
compiled by the Los Angeles City Clerk and contained text, summaries, arguments
- pro and con - and rebuttals for approximately half-a-dozen city ballot measures.
Although the pages were fewer - the 1988 version ran sixty-four pages - and smaller
- eight and a half by five inches rather than eight and a half by eleven inches - and
the print was a good deal larger, I was too dazed to exhibit the proper appreciation.
By the time a third pamphlet arrived, a gift from the County Registrar-Recorder
with information concerning the county measures, earthquakes were starting to
look appealing.
Eule, supra note 6, at 1508-09.
30. The increase of initiatives in California has been attributed to the passage of
Proposition 13, a popular initiative that placed a ceiling on ad valorem taxes on real
property. LaBarre, Initiative, Ina, GOLDEN ST. REP. 13 (Oct. 1988). Proposition 13
produced the unintended effect of reducing the amount of funding available to the
schools. This result led to the approval of another initiative, Proposition 98, which
increased funding to schools as a remedy to Proposition 13. Price, supra note 27, at
485.
31. LaBarre, supra note 30, at 13.
32. Salzman, supra note 28, at 8.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Price, supra note 27, at 481.
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growth measures. These figures compare unfavorably with the 80% of
growth control measures approved, and with only 14% of pro-growth
measures approved in 1987. 3" Notably, the cost of such ballots in Cali-
fornia exceeded $130 million, moving one California legislator to re-
mark that initiative and referendum had become "a tool of the private
interests." 36
Moreover, special interest groups occasionally have proposed initia-
tives with an extremely narrow focus. For instance, some recent initia-
tives "have dealt with controversial subjects like gay rights and
legalized gambling; calling into question the appropriateness of decid-
ing such volatile issues by popular vote.",37 Legislation that impacts on
such small groups of citizens is exactly the sort of majority tyranny
that Madison sought to avoid.38 The concern over majority tyranny is
especially relevant when the subject of an initiative or referendum is
the rezoning of a particular parcel of land affecting a very small minor-
ity - frequently one person. When the subject matter impacts on a
small group, it becomes very easy for a majority faction to form and
sacrifice the interests of the minority landowner. This scenario
presents precisely the type of situation that Rousseau did not foresee,
and which Madison sought to guard against.3 9
Even these situations, however, do not single out a particular indi-
vidual or a particular piece of land, as does rezoning by initiative.
While demonstrating some narrowing of subject matter, the history of
initiative and referendum reveals that initiative and referendum still
maintain a broadly legislative focus either on policy, or on the applica-
tion of a particular measure across a spectrum of the population in a
35. 3 CALIFORNIA PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT No. 12, at 1 (Dec.
1988).
36. Initiative Pro and Con, Sunday Star-Bull. & Advertiser, May 21, 1989, at B-3.
37. Comment, The Use of Initiative in Municipal Zoning, 55 UMKC L. REv. 284,
285 (1987). The City Council of St. Paul, Minnesota attempted to protect gay rights
when it enacted an ordinance prohibiting discrimination based upon, among other
things, sexual preference. The voters amended this ordinance by initiative to delete the
language referring to sexual preference. Thus, they used the majority power to eliminate
legislation protective of a minority group. Comment, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning
the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating By Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
733, 749 (1988).
38. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text discussing Madison's arguments
against a pure democratic form of government.
39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text discussing Rousseau's views toward
representative governments; supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text discussing
Madison's views toward republican form of government.
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given jurisdiction. Rezoning by initiative or referendum, however,
does not fall into either category. Rather, it is directed at a specific
piece of property owned by a specific landowner. Therein lies the
problem.
III. THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE 1980's
Concluding a trilogy of cases," the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Kai-
ser Hawaii Kai Development Co. v. City of Honolulu (Sandy Beach)4 1
held that zoning by popular vote, at least through the use of initiative,
is illegal. Significantly, Sandy Beach represents the only Hawaii case
to date squarely addressing the legality of popular voting on land use
decisions.4 2
The facts in Sandy Beach are straightforward. Kaiser Hawaii Kai
Development Company (Kaiser) proposed to develop a tract of land
located across the Kalanianaole Highway from Sandy Beach Park, a
popular public beach park.4 3 The proposed development entailed the
construction of over 150 expensive single-family homes in close prox-
imity to a golf course.' The tract had been zoned for residential use
since 1954 and designated for residential use on the applicable develop-
ment plan for the City and County of Honolulu since its adoption in
1983."5 Hearings for a shoreline management permit for a portion of
the residential project alerted Honolulu residents to the impending de-
40. Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 480, 777 P.2d 244
(1989); Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989);
County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins., 651 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982),
appeal dismissed sub nom, Pacific Standard Life Ins. v. Committee to Save Nukolii, 460
U.S. 1077 (1983).
41. 70 Haw. 480, 777 P.2d 244 (1989). Kaiser Hawaii became popularly known as
the Sandy Beach case through the efforts of the coalition seeking to stop the develop-
ment in question through popular initiative.
42. The two cases completing the trilogy deal with initiative or referendum either
indirectly or through dicta, and therefore, are only somewhat useful in determining the
scope of our common law on ballot box zoning. See supra note 40 citing pertinent
cases.
43. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 482, 777 P.2d at 245-46. The Kamehameha
Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate owned the disputed tract of land. Id. at 481, 777
P.2d at 245.
44. Id. at 481, 777 P.2d at 245.
45. Pursuant to its charter, Honolulu's nine charter mandated development plans
take precedence over rezonings and subdivision applications. The plans are composed
of detailed maps and texts which cover all of Honolulu (Island of Oahu).
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velopment.46 In time, substantial public opposition materialized and
coalesced into the "Save Sandy Beach Coalition" (Coalition). 7 The
Coalition circulated and certified a petition in accordance with the
Honolulu City Charter48 which placed an initiative measure before the
voters of the City and County on November 8, 1988.4 1 The petition
sought to change the development plan map classification from resi-
dential to preservation, and to "downzone" or reclassify the tract on
the City and County's zoning map from R-5 residential to P-2
preservation. °
The initiative measure overwhelmingly passed. Kaiser, however,
brought suit to set aside the measure. The lower court held that the
state enabling act granted the power to zone exclusively to the City
Council and, therefore, the exercise of the charter-authorized initiative
over zoning was unauthorized and illegal."1
The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the decision of the trial
court, but on significantly different grounds. The court noted that the
language of the Zoning Enabling Act 2 clearly indicated the legisla-
ture's emphasis on comprehensive planning for reasoned and orderly
development.5' Further, the court stated that zoning by initiative was
46. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 482, 777 P.2d at 245.
47. Id. at 482, 777 P.2d at 246.
48. REVISED CHARTER OF HONOLULU art. III, ch. 4, § 3-402 (1984).
49. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 482, 777 P.2d at 246.
50. Id. at 482, 777 P.2d at 246.
51. Id.
52. HAw. REV. STAT. § 46-4(a) (Supp. 1988).
53. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 484, 777 P.2d at 246-47. Quoting the Zoning En-
abling Act's language, the court accurately portrayed the legislature's concern for or-
derly development and zoning through comprehensive planning:
Zoning in all counties shall be accomplished within the framework of a long range,
comprehensive general plan prepared or being prepared to guide the overall future
development of the county. Zoning shall be one of the tools available to the county
to put the general plan into effect in an orderly manner.
... The powers granted herein shall be liberally construed in favor of the county
exercising them, and in such a manner as to promote the orderly development of
each county or city and county in accord with a long range, comprehensive, and
general plan, and to insure the greatest benefit for the State as a whole.
Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 483-84, 777 P.2d at 246-47 (emphasis added) (quoting HAw.
REV. STAT. § 46-4-(a) (Supp. 1988)). The Court further stated that:
The pressure of a rapidly increasing population in the Territory of Hawaii requires
an orderly economic growth within the various counties and the conservation and
development of all natural resources. Adequate controls must be established,
maintained and enforced by responsible agencies of government to reduce waste
and put all of our limited land area, and the resources found thereon, to their most
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inconsistent with the goal of long range comprehensive planning. 4
Consequently, the court found it unlikely that the legislature intended
to permit the initiative process to supersede local zoning."5
The Coalition, however, argued that the initiative process was re-
served to the people regardless of what the legislature may have in-
tended and despite adverse effects on planning.5 6 The court flatly
rejected this contention. 7 In making its determination, the court re-
marked that all the cases cited in support of the Coalitions argument
were from jurisdictions in which the state constitution reserved to the
people either initiative, referendum, or both.5" In contrast, the Hawaii
constitution reserves neither initiative nor referendum power to the
people.
Lastly, the Coalition argued that the court had dealt with the issue
of popular vote already in the Nukoii case. 9 Indicating that Nukolii
beneficial use. It is the intent and purpose of the legislature, by means of zoning
ordinances and regulations enacted by or under this act, and in accord with a long
range, comprehensive general plan, to promote the health, safety, convenience, or-
der, welfare and prosperity of the present and future inhabitants of the Territory.
Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 483-84, 777 P.2d at 246-47 (quoting Haw. Sess. Laws § 1, Act
234). These excerpts indicate that the court is not merely addressing the question of
whether the legislature authorizes initiative and referendum. Rather, the court has con-
cluded that however enacted, those ordinances must comport with the long-range gen-
eral plan embodied in the Zoning Enabling Act. Id. at 489, 777 P.2d at 250. Indeed,
the court reasonably concluded that the legislature did not even contemplate zoning by
initiative when it enacted the Zoning Enabling Act. Id. at 486, 777 P.2d at 248.
54. Id. at 484, 777 P.2d at 247. The court cited several cases from other jurisdic-
tions for the proposition that initiative is inconsistent with zoning plans. Id. citing
Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125
N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973); Smith v. Livingston Township, 106 N.J. Super.
444, 256 A.2d 85 (1969); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306
(1976). Although the court noted that Spillane and Leonard dealt with referenda, it
nevertheless found their reasoning applicable to initiatives in the context of comprehen-
sive zoning plans. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 484, 777 P.2d at 246-47.
55. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 484, 777 P.2d at 246 (citing Smith v. Livingston
Township, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 457, 256 A.2d 85, 92 (1989)).
56. Id. at 484, 777 P.2d at 248-50.
57. Id. at 487, 777 P.2d at 248-49 n.3.
58. Id.
59. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d
766 (1982), represented the first Hawaii case to consider land use referenda. This case,
known as the "Nukolli" case, was named after the Kauai beach over which the litiga-
tion arose. In Nukoii, the court held that rights to proceed with a development vested
only after a landowner changed his position by relying upon rights obtained after the
issuance of the last necessary discretionary permit. Id. at 338, 653 P.2d at 780. That
permit - to construct a hotel and condominiums - was a referendum. The petition for
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was a referendum case, not an initiative case as in Sandy Beach, the
court rejected this argument on the further ground that "the court in
the Nukolii case was not faced with the issue of whether zoning by
referendum is permissible in light of H.R.S. § 46-4(a). We, therefore,
hold that the Nukolii case is inapposite."'e
In sum, the Sandy Beach Court decided that the legislature had not
authorized zoning by initiative or referendum. In so holding, the
Court declared that zoning by initiative is inconsistent with the goal of
long range comprehensive planning (which appears in other statutes
than just the Zoning Enabling Act). Moreover, neither initiative nor
referendum powers are reserved to the people absent a constitutional
amendment to that effect. The court, however, did not address
whether zoning by initiative's failure to provide for notice, hearing, and
planning commission recommendations violates either statutory or
constitutional due process. Furthermore, the court did not decide
whether land use decisions of the map amendment type, like rezonings,
are principally legislative acts otherwise subject to initiative and refer-
endum after the above issues are satisfactorily resolved, or quasi-judi-
the referendum, moreover, had been certified before the developer obtained what other-
wise represented the last discretionary permit: a special management area permit or
SMA permit. Id. at 330, 653 P.2d at 775.
As the Sandy Beach Court noted, the Nukoii court never considered the legality of
the referendum process to reclassify land in conjunction with the Zoning Enabling Act
and so cannot be said to have ruled on that issue. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. 480, 485, 777
P.2d 244, 247-48 (1989). Even if the court had considered its Nukoli decision as some-
how binding on the subject of citizen participation, at least two crucial differences
would make it inapplicable to the Sandy Beach litigation.
First, Nukoii involved the referendum process, whereas Sandy Beach dealt with the
power of initiative. The referendum process at least has the virtue of permitting the
planning and zoning process to go forward, even if it has the potential of knocking the
whole into a cocked hat by rendering a popular decision directly at odds with those
processes. The initiative is far more damaging, as it does not provide for such process at
all.
Second, at least some due process is afforded to parties in either the initiative or
referendum process under the Kauai charter. The Kauai County Council is required
"immediately to consider an initiative or referendum petition which has been deter-
mined sufficient in accordance with the provision of this article .... If a referendum
petition is concerned, the ordinance to which that petition is directed shall be reconsid-
ered by the council .... " KAUAI COUNTY CHARTER art. XXII, § 22.07 (1984). There-
fore some minimum procedure arguably brings in some planning process. The planning
process, however, was wholly lacking under the Honolulu initiative procedure used in
the Sandy Beach case.
60. Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 485, 777 P.2d at 248. For a fuller discussion, see
Note, Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Company v. City and County of Honolulu: Zon-
ing by Initiative in Hawaii, 12 U. HAw. L. REv. 181 (1990).
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cial, contested case acts,6 1 which are not subject to popular vote as a
matter of law.6 2
The following sections address these issues, revisit the effects of initi-
ative on plans and planning, and briefly note the effects of initiative on
the rights of minorities.
IV. DUE PROCESS AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The fourteenth amendment's due process clause requires procedural
61. Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974).
62. Bi-MetaIIi Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). The
issues decided in the Sandy Beach litigation very nearly were decided some months
before in Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989)
(Date-Laau). In Date-Laau, the Hawaii Supreme Court failed to reach the issue of the
legality of zoning by initiative because the Honolulu City Council passed an ordinance
conforming to the results of the initiative thereby rendering the issue moot. The court,
however, discussed the importance of planning in land use decision-making at length,
which, in hindsight, foreshadowed its decision in Sandy Beach.
In the Date-Laau case, owners of a 5.5 acre tract in Nukolii appealed a lower court
decision upholding the City Council's conforming ordinance which classified the prop-
erty for low-density apartment development. Id. at 181-86, 767 P.2d at 817-19. The
lower court also found the initiative ordinance making the medium-density classifica-
tion illegal because the state enabling act conferred zoning authority only on the city
council. Id. The Supreme Court of Hawaii never reached the city's challenge of the
initiative ordinance, however, after it upheld the City Council ordinance. Id. at 192
n.15, 767 P.2d at 823 n.15. For over fifty years, the property had been classified, but not
used, for high-density residential use. Further, briefly in 1984, the city classified it as
medium-density in response to resident concerns over the loss of low-income housing in
the predominantly two and three story apartment complexes on the tract. Id. at 184-85,
767 P.2d at 818-19.
While not particularly enlightening on the use of initiative and referendum, the Date-
Laau case is a virtual textbook on the importance of plans and their relationship to
zoning. Not only does the court set out in great detail the character and contents of
development plans in the city and county, id. at 182-83, 767 P.2d at 817-18, dwelling at
great length on the requirement that zoning ordinances must conform to such plans, but
also the court fully discusses the importance of state plans and their relationship to
county plans. Id. at 186-87, 767 P.2d at 821. The court further noted that the Hawaii
State Plan requires county development and general plans to consider statewide objec-
tives, policies, and programs stipulated in state functional plans, thus, providing a
framework for state and county planning. Moreover, the court then made the critical
finding that the Council's zoning ordinance was "clearly enacted" within the framework
of the functional plans. Id. In so holding, the court quoted portions of the State Hous-
ing Functional Plan pertaining to low income housing. Id. Moreover, in rejecting Lum
Yip Kee's contention that the council had not changed the plan designation on their
property on bases set out in State Plan, the court held that "the City Council Ordinance
was 'formulated on the basis of sound rationale, data, analyses, and input from the state
and county agencies and the general public.'" Id. at 189, 767 P.2d at 821-22.
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safeguards to accompany any deprivation of property.63 Federal law
sets forth the minimum due process requirements of notice, hearing
and standards to guide delegated decision makers. States may require
additional protections beyond the federal requirement, but they may
not authorize the deprivation of a protected right without these mini-
mum procedural safeguards. 6
4
A. Federal Due Process and the Problem with Eastlake
A federal due process attack on an initiative or referendum may take
one of two forms. The landowner may either object to the lack of no-
tice and hearing as a violation of federal due process requirements, or
claim that allowing the voters to rezone his land amounts to a
standardless delegation of legislative power.
1. Due Process and Notice
Due process violations may arise when the affected individual is not
given notice or an opportunity to be heard in the decision-making pro-
cess.65 The Court has held that for a notice to be valid, it must be
reasonably calculated to apprise all interested parties of the pendency
of the action, afford them reasonable opportunity to make their appear-
ance and present their objections, and reasonably convey the required
information.6 6 Thus, notice "should include not only the time, date,
and place of the hearing, but it should also provide an adequate de-
scription of the property at issue and the nature of the proposed
change."'6 7 Moreover, the due process clause's procedural protections
are tailored to the demands of the particular situation.68 In rezoning
matters, the landowner must be allowed the opportunity to protest the
decision to rezone the property and to "present and rebut evidence.",
69
63. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment reads: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
65. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Scott v. City of Indian
Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
66. Kahn, In Accordance With a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and
Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1039 (1979) (citing Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
67. Kahn, supra note 66, at 1040.
68. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
69. Kahn, supra note 66, at 1041.
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Denying the landowner such an opportunity would violate the concept
of fairness which is the "essence of due process."7
Courts favoring the use of initiative and referendum generally have
thwarted this requirement by characterizing the rezoning as legislative.
Constitutional due process applies to administrative or quasi-judicial
decisions, but not to legislative ones. Thus, once the action is charac-
terized as legislative, the due process clause does not apply.71
Simple labeling of all zoning actions as legislative is arguably uncon-
stitutional because most rezonings affect only a small number of peo-
ple. In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,72 the
United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a city
wide tax measure. The Tax Board of Colorado had issued an order
increasing the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by 40%. 71
The plaintiff, a real estate owner in Denver, objected to the order on
the ground that it violated his due process rights by not giving him an
opportunity to be heard.74 The Court phrased the issue as "whether all
individuals have a constitutional right to be heard before a matter can
be decided in which all are equally concerned,"75 and held that due
process is not required where a "rule of conduct applies to more than a
few people.",76 Logically, rezonings must therefore be examined to de-
termine whether they apply to more than a few people. If rezonings
apply to more than a few people, then they are deemed legislative and
70. Note, Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and
Landowners' Due Process Rights, 70 CALIF. L. Rav. 1107, 1125-26 (1982).
71. In San Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council of San Diego, 13
Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), the court held that the enactment
by initiative of a generally applicable building height restriction constituted a legislative
act. Therefore, "the constitutional requirements of 'notice' and 'hearing' do not apply."
Id. at 211, 529 P.2d at 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149. Likewise, in Arnel Development Co.
v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980), the
Supreme Court of California upheld an initiative that rezoned a 68 acre parcel from
apartment use to single family residential use. Id. at 525, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal.
Rptr. at 912. In so ruling, the court characterized all zoning actions as legislative re-
gardless of the size of the parcel. Id. at 521-22, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910-
11. The court admitted that this was done largely for the sake of convenience. Id. at
514, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The Supreme Court of Colorado in Margo-
lis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981), carried the Arnel logic to its extreme
when it held that the rezoning of 3.34 acres was a legislative act. Id. at 305.
72. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
73. Id. at 443.
74. Id. at 444.
75. Id. at 445.
76. Id.
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no procedural safeguards are required. If not, however, then due pro-
cess requirements must be met. 7
2. Due Process, Standardless Delegation and Eastlake
The standardless delegation of zoning powers to the voters presents
the second issue raising a constitutional due process question in the
context of initiative and referendum. The Supreme Court focused on
this issue in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 78 Several
commentators have pointed out, however, that Eastlake is far from be-
coming a consistent basis for later decisions.79 Rather, most jurisdic-
tions considering popular voting on land use matters have dealt with
the subject on other grounds such as state due process, effect on plan-
ning, effect on property rights, and quasi-judicial versus legislative.8'
This result is not surprising given the narrowness of the Eastlake deci-
sion and the issues the Court failed to address. Although Eastlake has
been cited for the sweeping proposition that the use of initiative and
referendum in zoning does not violate the due process clause,3 ' its
holding is far narrower. The Court held that where the Ohio Constitu-
tion reserved the power of initiative and referendum to the people, the
use of referendum to rezone was not a standardless delegation of power
violative of due process.82
In Eastlake, Forest City Enterprises acquired an eight acre parcel
zoned for light industrial uses in Eastlake.83 Forest City applied to the
City Planning Commission for a zoning change to allow a high rise
apartment building.84 The City Council, upon recommendation of the
Planning Commission, allowed the change.85 Meanwhile, the voters of
Eastlake amended the city charter to require that any land use changes
agreed to by the Council be approved by a fifty-five percent vote in a
77. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445. The Supreme Court in City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), never reached this issue. See infra notes 78-
103 for an in-depth discussion of Eastlake.
78. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
79. See Goetz, Direct Democracy in Land Use Planning: The State Response to
Eastlake, 19 PAC. L.J. 793, 794-95 (1987); Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 415.
80. Goetz, supra note 79, at 794-95.
81. See, eg., Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla.
1983).
82. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 677 n. 11.
83. Id. at 670.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 670-71.
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referendum.86 Forest City then applied to the Commission for "park-
ing and yard" approval.87 Approval was denied on the ground that the
voters had not yet approved the rezoning.8" Subsequently, Forest City
chaUenged the charter amendment as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the people. An Ohio appellate court held that the
amendment was valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed that deci-
sion and held that while rezoning was a legislative function, the
standardless delegation of this legislative power to the voters permitted
the police power to be used in an arbitrary and capricious manner.89
Consequently, the court found that the amendment violated the due
process clause. 90
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the Supreme
Court of Ohio's decision.9' In reaching its conclusion, the Court ex-
plained that lawmaking power flowed from the people to the legisla-
ture.92 The people could reserve some of this power if they so
desired. 93 In the Ohio Constitution, the people specifically had re-
served to themselves the power of initiative and referendum. 94 Because
the people did not surrender this power to the legislature, no delegation
of power from the legislature to the people occurred and, consequently,
no delegation, standardless or not, violated due process. 95 Accord-
ingly, the Court upheld the charter amendment. 96
The Court's analysis clearly indicates that Eastlake does not stand
for the proposition that the use of initiative and referendum must meet
all federal due process requirements. First, standardless delegation, the
only federal due process issue the court addressed, is but one aspect of
due process. A violation may still occur for lack of notice and hearing
86. Id.
87. Id. at 671.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St.2d 187,
324 N.E.2d 740 (1975)).
90. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 673.
95. Id. at 675.
96. Id. at 679. As a result of the Court's decision, the requisite 55% vote of ap-
proval was not garnered. Id. Thus, the proposed zoning change to allow a high rise
apartment failed "with the resulting exclusion of minorities and persons of low in-
come." Goetz, supra note 79, at 801.
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or other procedural due process irregularities. Second, the Ohio Con-
stitution explicitly reserved the power of initiative and referendum to
the people. As noted below,97 this makes it more likely, though by no
means conclusive, for a court to uphold rezoning by initiative. Only
when the initiative and referendum power is reserved in the state con-
stitution could a court conclude that standardless delegation of the
power to zone is irrelevant because the power is reserved and not dele-
gated. Finally, Eastlake is a referendum case, not an initiative case.
Because more governmental process is associated with referenda, the
proposition to be voted on has at least been through the requisite state
and local procedures normally accompanying a rezoning: notice, hear-
ings, planning commission review and recommendation.
The Eastlake Court offered no opinion on other critical initiative
and referendum questions.98 The Court failed to decide whether the
rezoning of property was a legislative or a quasi-judicial act, as it had
done for variances. Rather, the Court deferred to the Supreme Court
of Ohio's "binding interpretation"99 of the action as legislative. If the
Ohio court had held the rezoning a quasi-judicial act, then presumably,
the United States Supreme Court would be bound by this interpreta-
tion and the action would not be referendable.
The Court's decision is puzzling given that even Justice Black in
James v. Valtierra "0 would confine initiative and referendum to "ques-
tions of public policy."'0' It is difficult, however, to identify the public
policy in the Eastlake rezoning. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ste-
vens indicated that he would not grant such a high degree of deference
to a state determination of whether the action was legislative or not.102
Moreover, Justice Stevens stated that he would not give "legislative"
status to any rezoning unless the public policy aspects of that particu-
lar use of land at that particular location could be clearly
97. See infra notes 157-97 and accompanying text discussing the reservation of the
power of initiative and referendum in the state constitution as a prerequisite to ballot
box zoning.
98. See Freilich & Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to Public Participation in
Land Use Policy: Effective Zoning and Planning by Initiative and Referendum, 21 URB.
LAW. 511, 513 (1989).
99. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 674 n.9.
100. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (cited in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426
U.S. 668, 678 (1976)).
101. Id. at 141.
102. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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demonstrated.10 3
In sum, Eastlake is good law only to the extent of its narrow hold-
ing: where the Ohio Constitution reserved the power of initiative and
referendum to the people, the use of referendum to rezone was not a
standardless delegation of power violating part of federal due process
requirements. The Eastlake decision offers no guidance on whether its
holding applies to initiatives.
B. State Statutes and Due Process
Apart from serious federal due process issues, zoning by initiative is
also contrary to the statutory processes provided in most planning and
zoning enabling legislation. Two principal issues are: (1) who or what
body should zone under the statutes, and (2) what procedural safe-
guards are necessary for that zoning. As one commentator has re-
cently stated, rezoning by initiative or referendum is essentially "an
end-run around carefully enacted procedures for zoning decisions." 1°4
No hearings, amendments, compromise, professional planners' reports,
and affected landowners' testimony are needed. Further, no city coun-
cil members are held accountable for a controversial decision. 05
A number of courts have struck down initiative or referendum pre-
cisely on the ground that it either directly contradicted state zoning
enabling legislation, or indirectly provided a body without delegated
authority to zone with the power to reclassify. These decisions come
both before and after the Eastlake decision, and clearly indicate that
whether or not referenda are compatible with federal due process,
states are concerned with the language in their own enabling acts.
Perhaps the clearest statement comes from the Superior Court of
New Jersey. °" Holding zoning amendments by referendum illegal, the
court found certain aspects of the zoning statute inherently at odds
with the referendum process.107 Specifically, the court noted that in
authorizing local governing bodies to establish administrative agencies
to regulate zoning, the state laid down specific and detailed procedures
to be followed."' Further, the court stated that such comprehensive
103. Id. at 693.
104. Goetz, supra note 79, at 833.
105. Id. at 833-34.
106. Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973).
107. Id. at 526, 312 A.2d at 158.
108. Id. at 526, 312 A.2d at 157.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
74 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 39:53
and precise treatment demonstrated the legislature's special concern in
municipal zoning regulation." 9 Finally, the court concluded that the
publicity which might accompany the referendum campaign and the
exposure and discussion generated did not justify disregarding these
procedural requirements.1 10
In striking down certain bulk amendments to a municipal zoning
code, the Supreme Court of Idaho provided equally strong language.'11
Although the court appeared to rely in part on what it interpreted as
the state's specific delegation of zoning power to local legislative bod-
ies, the court's language is far broader. Specifically, the court stated
that the Local Planning Act's express procedures indicated that the
legislature intended to give local legislative bodies authority to con-
sider, amend, or enact zoning plans.11 2 Consequently, the court found
that the comprehensiveness of Idaho zoning legislation left no room for
zoning by initiative.113
The Supreme Court of Washington likewise limited referenda or ini-
tiatives' use on rezonings by refusing to issue a writ of mandamus for a
referendum on a commercial rezoning."' The court held that the leg-
islature granted the power to zone exclusively to the local legislative
body.115 Because the legislature knew of the statutes' referendum and
109. Id. at 526, 312 A.2d at 158.
110. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. at 527, 312 A.2d at 158. The court also expressed
concern about the local planning commission's authority and affected landowners'
rights:
Whether the referendum stems from a submission of an ordinance by the governing
body directly to the voters or by a referendum petition filed by the necessary
number of voters, the so-called veto power of the planning board or protesting
landowners would be rendered meaningless. A simple majority of the voters would
be all that was necessary to approve or disapprove the ordinance.
d.
111. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983).
112. Id. at 617, 771 P.2d at 1216-17 (emphasis added). The court noted that the
local planning act required a myriad of procedures, including:
holding advisory and informational meetings and hearings in developing plans and
zoning structures,] ... conducting a comprehensive planning process to prepare,
implement and update the comprehensive plan, which is to be based upon specific,
delineated components ... and, giving notice to interested parties and holding
public hearings prior to the recommendation, adoption or amendment of a plan or
zoning ordinance....
Id.
113. Id. at 618, 661 P.2d at 1217.
114. Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (en banc).
115. Id. at 853, 557 P.2d at 1310.
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initiative authorization provisions, the Court explained that, presuma-
bly, the legislature could have appropriately amended those provisions
if it so chose.' 16  Moreover, the court stated that zoning code amend-
ments require individuals possessing the expertise to consider the total
economic, social, and physical characteristic of the community to
make informed and intelligent choices.117 The court further expressed
the concern that the voters in a referendum election may not have an
adequate opportunity to read relevant information regarding the pro-
posed land use change.' In contrast, the court found that local legis-
lative bodies normally possess the necessary experience to make
difficult zoning decisions.1 19
In Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co.,120 the Supreme Court of Utah
held that the power to legislate by initiative, although specifically re-
served to the people in the state constitution, did not apply to zon-
ing.12 ' In so holding, the court stated that the power to initiate
116. Id.
117. Id. at 854, 557 P.2d at 1311.
118. Leonard, 87 Wash. 2d at 854, 557 P.2d at 1311.
119. Id. Similarly, in San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d
260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), a Texas appellate court held a rezoning ordinance was not
subject to the initiative nor referendum provisions of a city charter. Id. at 262. Noting
that statutory authority empowers Texas cities to zone, and requires public hearings
and planning commission recommendation, the court explained:
To give effect to the election in this case... would be to add a procedural step to
zoning which is not required by the comprehensive provisions of the Enabling Act.
A city can no more add a step to the procedures required by state law than it can
omit one.
Id. at 262.
Even more pervasive in its limitation on initiative and referendum is the Supreme
Court of Arizona's decision in City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439
P.2d 290 (1968) (en banc). In that case, the court upheld an injunction prohibiting an
election on a municipal rezoning. Id. at 207, 439 P.2d 293. The court found that the
state statutory zoning requirements of a public hearing on zoning amendments appar-
ently granted the power to zone to the local legislative body alone. Id. at 205-06, 439
P.2d at 291-92. Consequently, the court stated:
[I]t is clear and we hold that the initiative process is not available as a mode for
amending a comprehensive zoning plan. It is an irreconcilable conflict with... the
express provisions of the state statute which delegated zoning powers to the gov-
erning body of an incorporated city.
Id. at 207-08, 439 P.2d at 293-94. See also Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d 1, 4 (rex.
Civ. App. 1969) (holding that the general statutory enabling act's notice and hearing
requirements for zoning could not be complied with if the ordinance was submitted to
the voters).
120. 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954).
121. Id. at 6-7, 277 P.2d at 809.
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legislation was limited to the types of legislation subject to initiative.122
The court reasoned that because the legislature also had power to act
under the constitution and had chosen to protect private property by
setting out procedural due process requirements in the state zoning en-
abling statute, the initiative could not be used to rezone private prop-
erty. 123 Because the city had to comply with the due process set out in
the statute, the court added, so did the people.124
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Westgate Families v. County
Clerk struck down a referendum returning newly reclassified residen-
tial and planned development parcels to a recreational-wilderness dis-
trict on the ground that even in a home rule county, "the [Zoning
Enabling] Act indicates both procedural and substantive limitations
are imposed upon Counties when exercising its zoning power." 125 The
court also precluded the county from zoning by referendum because
the Zoning Enabling Act, stating that a proposed ordinance "shall be
passed only by a majority vote of... the board of county commission-
ers," thereby expressly limited rezoning to "representative bodies.
'
"
126
In contrast, California courts take the opposite view with respect to
statutory process. In Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of
Livermore,127 the Supreme Court of California conclusively held that
the zoning enabling act's notice and hearing provisions did not apply to
zoning ordinances enacted by initiative. 121 In making its determina-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Dewey, 3 Utah 2d at 7, 277 P.2d 809 (1954). The Missouri courts also have
refused to permit an election on a rezoning of a 225 acre tract from residential to indus-
trial even though the constitution gave citizens the right to initiative. See State ex rel.
Powers v. Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1963). In part, they refused because there
would be no notice, hearing, or report from the planning commission, all of which the
zoning enabling act required. Id. at 438-39.
However, the Missouri courts otherwise construe rezonings as legislative acts and a
recent appellate court decision found that certain notification and hearing processes
preceding a rezoning initiative satisfied the Donohue requirements, particularly after the
United States Supreme Court's Eastlake decision. Motions for rehearing and/or trans-
fer to the Supreme Court of Missouri were denied and it remains to be seen whether
that court would agree with this somewhat altered position. See State ex rel. Hickman
v. City Council, 690 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1985).
125. Westgate Families v. County Clerk, 100 N.M. 146, 148, 667 P.2d 453, 455
(1983).
126. Id. Accord State ex reL MacQueen v. City of Dunbar, 167 W. Va. 91, 278
S.E.2d 636 (1981).
127. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
128. Id. at 596, 557 P.2d at 480-81, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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tion, the court recognized that the state constitution, amended in 1911
to reserve the power of initiative and referendum to the people, was of
paramount importance and authority 2 9 Indeed, the court set out at
length the process which led to the amendment and its critical impor-
tance in California. 3 ' Unlike any other state, California's constitu-
tional reservation of initiative and referendum overshadows virtually
all other legal considerations in the California courts.
The Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision in R.G. Moore
Building Corp. v. Committee for Repeal 13 demonstrates the legal dam-
age that results from an overbroad reading of Eastlake.'32 In R.G.
Moore, a developer challenged a rezoning referendum on a host of
grounds, including that it was an improper delegation of power to the
electorate. 133 The Supreme Court of Virginia purported to find a dele-
gation of authority for initiatives and referenda in the Virginia Consti-
tution's general language that "all power is vested in and consequently
derived from, the people." 134 The court then quoted Eastlake dicta to
the effect that a referendum cannot be characterized as a delegation of
power.135 The court, however, failed to note the context from which
the Eastlake dicta emerged - the Ohio Constitution's specific delega-
tion of authority for initiative and referendum.
Even generally pro-initiative commentators concede this extremely
limited nature of the Eastlake holding. 136 The Virginia court somehow
failed to grasp that even though the people of a state are indeed the
source of power, they have by their state constitution delegated law-
making power to the legislature except insofar as some powers are spe-
cifically reserved.137 The Court further stated that the reservation
came through the charter. That fact is no help if the local government,
a creature of the state, was not specifically delegated authority to so
reserve the power under the state constitution.
In sum, a number of the foregoing cases demonstrate that many ju-
129. Id. at 591, 557 P.2d at 479-80, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
130. Id.
131. 239 Va. 484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
132. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
133. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp., 239 Va. at--, 391 S.E.2d at 588.
134. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 589, (citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 2).
135. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 589.
136. Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 99, at 523, 527-28.
137. D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH, P. SALSICH & J. WEGNER, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 1 (1990).
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risdictions have restricted their procedural limits in rezoning by initia-
tive to matters of constitutional due process, often holding that
rezonings by initiative violate legislative due process. They have the
better argument. The California courts do not address the lack of fair-
ness to a property owner caused by the elimination of statutory hear-
ing, notice, and expert review procedures required of local
governments. It is the majority's wielding of this unfairness against the
minority that was as much on the minds of our founding fathers as
protection against an unfair biased government.138
V. ZONING BY INITIATIVE: LEGISLATIVE OR QUASI-JUDICIAL?
One of the principal issues confronting a court in deciding whether a
land use measure is subject to initiative or referendum is its legislative
or quasi-judicial character.139 Black letter law provides that legislative
decisions are "referendable" - subject to either initiative or referen-
dum, other things being equal - but quasi-judicial ones are not.' 4
This rule exists because people as a whole have no legally protected
interest in the application of law and policy to an individual or particu-
lar situation as compared to a broad policy decision affecting everyone.
Moreover, the adjudication of individual situations are immune from
random decisions by popular vote. Thus, the characterization of zon-
ing decisions as either legislative or quasi-judicial will determine
whether such decisions are subject to initiative or referendum as a mat-
ter of law.
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Fasano v. Board of County Com-
missioners141 provides the principal decision on the subject. In Fasano,
the court considered whether the local legislative body's map amend-
ment to a zoning ordinance was a legislative act.142 The court stated
that zoning ordinances detailing general policies without regard to a
specific piece of property typically characterize an exercise of legisla-
138. See Eule, supra note 6, at 1522-30.
139. Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 99, at 528.
140. A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, ch. 27, § 3 (1975); 42
AM. JUR. 2d Initiative and Referendum § 11 (1969).
141. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
142. Id. at 579, 507 P.2d at 26. Initially, the court stated that it "would be ignoring
reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to
be accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less than constitutional
scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers.. ." Id.
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tive authority. 143 In contrast, the court found that the determination
of whether a specific piece of property's permissible use should be
changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority. 1" Accordingly,
the court held that the commission's actions in this instance consti-
tuted an exercise of judicial authority. 145
While the Oregon courts have perhaps presented the most effective
case for zoning as a quasi-judicial act, they are by no means the only
courts to so hold. Courts in other jurisdictions have not only found
map amendments to be administrative or quasi-judicial, but referen-
dum-proof as well.146
143. Id. at 580-81, 507 P.2d at 26.
144. Id. The court stated further:
An illustration of an exercise of legislative authority is the passage of the ordi-
nance by the Washington County Commission in 1963 which provided for the for-
mation of a planned residential classification to be located in or adjacent to any
residential zone. An exercise of judicial authority is the County Commissioners'
determination in this particular matter to change the classification of the A.G.S.
Development Company's specific piece of property.
Id.
145. Fasano, 264 Or. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. The Oregon courts reiterated this
position in a later case in which the Oregon Court of Appeals made it clear that initia-
tive would be wholly inappropriate for map amendments affecting only a single parcel
of property. See Allison v. Washington County, 24 Or. App. 571, 575, 548 P.2d 188,
190-91 (1976) (en banc). Allison involved initiative and referendum as applied to land
use policy. The court held that initiative was applicable to a comprehensive plan
amendment. Id. at 587-88, 507 P.2d at 197-98. The court stated, however, that:
As a preliminary matter, it is important to draw a threshold distinction between
legislative and quasi-judicial matters. Action is legislative when it affects a large
area consisting of many parcels of property in disparate ownership. An example
would be a zoning ordinance, that happened to be adopted by initiative, restricting
buildings to a height of 30 feet in all of San Diego California between Interstate 5
and the ocean. Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial when it applies a gen-
eral rule to a specific interest, such as a zoning change affecting a single piece of
property, a variance, or a conditional use permit. We are here concerned solely
with legislative action - a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance adopted or
amended by initiative or referendum that affects a large area in disparate
ownership.
Id. at 575, 548 P.2d at 190-91 (emphasis added).
146. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974). In
West, after exhaustive analysis of treatises, articles and cases from other jurisdictions,
the Supreme Court of Michigan held that an "amendatory ordinance" reclassifying 150
acres was administrative, and, therefore, not subject to a referendum. Id. at 472, 221
N.W.2d at 310. Although the court disagreed with its rationale, the court eventually
said in the course of its opinion:
We hold that the amendment adopted by the city commission of the City of Port-
age rezoning 150 acres of land from singie-family residential into sections allowing
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The Supreme Court of Nevada, for example, struck down a rezoning
by initiative on the ground that map amendments are administrative
and not legislative in character.147 Noting that municipal ordinances
may be either legislative or administrative, the court stated that the
establishment of a zoning policy to regulate the construction and use of
buildings within a fixed area is a legislative matter subject to referen-
dum.148 The court added, however, that once such a policy delegating
the power to grant exceptions to the planning commission and city
council has been determined in order to secure the uniformity neces-
sary to accomplish the purposes of the comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance, such action is administrative and not referendable.149 The court
concluded that such was the case here.150
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah in Bird v. Sorenson 151 refused
to issue a writ of mandamus for a referendum on the reclassification of
certain property from residential to commercial under a local zoning
ordinance.152 Stating that the determinative question was whether the
city council's action was administrative or legislative,'53 the court held
that if the action was administrative, it was not subject to referen-
dum. 54 In so holding, the court reasoned that "if each change in a
zoning classification were to be submitted to a vote of the city electors,
community business, multiple family and office service was an administrative, not a
legislative, act and, therefore, not subject to referendum....
Id. at 472, 221 N.W.2d at 310.
But see Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 406 Mich. 137, 277 N.W.2d 475
(1979). Although not overruling West, Zaagman has been cited in two Michigan appel-
late opinions for the proposition that zoning amendments constitute legislative acts, not
administrative acts. See Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Burton, 108 Mich.
App. 497, 502, 310 N.W.2d 438, 440-41 (1981) ("[w]e conclude that the majority opin-
ion adopted 'the legislative approach' and interpret Zaagman to permit application of
referendum to zoning amendments."); Chynoweth v. City of Hancock, 107 Mich. App.
360, 309 N.W.2d 606, 607 (1981) ("Since the majority of the present Court has indi-
cated more support for the legislative approach rather than the administrative ap-
proach, we conclude that the Court would find that this amendatory zoning ordinance
was a legislative act subject to the right of referendum.").
147. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234
(1973), reh'g denied, (1974).
148. Id. at 537-38, 516 P.2d at 1237.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
152. Id. at 2, 394 P.2d at 808.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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any master plan would be rendered inoperative. Such changes are ad-
ministrative acts implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it
to current conditions." '55  Since the Eastlake opinion, the Utah
Supreme Court has had occasion to revisit the issue of whether rezon-
ings are administrative or legislative and has come to the same
conclusion.156
In sharp contrast, however, is the leading Supreme Court of Califor-
nia opinion in Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa.'57 In
Arnel, the court held that California precedent has settled the principle
that zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are
legislative acts.' The court argued that to hold to the contrary would
disrupt years of established rules governing the enactment of land use
restrictions, creating confusion which would require years of litigation
to resolve.159 Further, the court reasoned that the distinction between
legislative and quasi-judicial acts is unnecessary to protect either the
rights of the landowners or the public interest in orderly community
development.' 6° Consequently, the court concluded that the ordinance
rezoning plaintiff's property was a legislative act.
161
The Arnel decision has been heavily criticized and largely viewed as
one based on judicial economy. 162 Additionally, the decision can best
be described as result-oriented, strengthened both by previous deci-
sions 163 and the fact that California is a very pro-initiative state.' 64
155. Id.
156. See Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982).
157. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980) (Richardson, 3.,
dissenting).
158. Id. at 514, 620 P.2d at 566-67, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
159. Id. at 523, 620 P.2d at 572-73, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
160. Id. at 523-24, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
161. Id. at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
162. See, e.g., Note, supra note 70, at 1107; Comment, The Legislative Adjudicative
Distinction in California Land Use Regulation: A Suggested Response to Arnel Develop-
ment Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 34 HASTrNGs L.J. 425 (1982); Comment, Instant Plan-
ning: Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 497 (1988).
163. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City
Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
164. In upholding zoning by initiative, the California courts place great weight on
the fact that the California Constitution guarantees the initiative process. See supra
notes 63-139 and accompanying text discussing the effects of constitutional reservation
of the initiative or referendum process on due process concerns. For example, in Associ-
ated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, the Supreme Court of California stated
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Indeed, the court was split on the legislative versus quasi-judicial ques-
tion, and the dissent set out strong arguments for holding as quasi-
judicial such rezoning decisions directly affecting only a few landown-
ers. Not surprisingly, California courts also have held plan amend-
ments to be legislative acts and therefore referendable, unless they
create internal inconsistencies or inconsistencies with zoning.
165
Equally difficult to follow is the Supreme Court of Virginia's ration-
ale in upholding a rezoning by referendum despite the landowners'
strong argument that rezoning is a nonlegislative act. In R. G. Moore
Building Corp. v. Committee for Repeal, 66 the court incorrectly ar-
gued that it would be "flagrantly" inconsistent to characterize a com-
prehensive zoning law's adoption as a legislative act, and an
amendment to such a law as a quasi-judicial act.167 In making its de-
termination, the court reasoned that if the original act was legislative,
that: "[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power
wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts
can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve
it." Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 591, 557 P.2d at 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 45
(emphasis added) (quoting Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 258, 101 Cal. Rptr.
628, 634 (1972), and Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563-64, 11 Cal. Rptr.
340, 344 (1961)). See also Building Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 718 P.2d
68, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1986) (procedural requirements enacted to help ease an affordable
housing shortage were inapplicable to the initiative process).
165. Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 685 P.2d 1152, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984).
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the California courts
in Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1983). Essentially
the court based its decision upon the United States Supreme Court's Eastlake opinion
and its inability to distinguish between the passage of an original zoning ordinance and
a map amendment. Id. at 173-74. Significantly, in Florida, the referendum is guaran-
teed by the Florida Constitution. Thus, the court held it was reserved to the people.
The same holds true for Nebraska.
Based upon the reasoning in the Arnel decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado re-
versed an earlier decision and held that rezonings of any size are legislative in character.
Margolis v. District Ct., 638 P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1981) (en banc). The court so held in
consolidated cases involving both a single lot and a 90 acre tract, on grounds which
seem more technical than logical:
It seems entirely inconsistent to hold that an original act of general zoning is legis-
lative, whereas an amendment to that act is not legislative. It appears only logical
that since the original act of zoning is legislative, the amendatory act of rezoning is
likewise legislative even though the procedures may entail notice and hearing
which characterizes a quasi-judicial proceeding.
Id. at 304. The court then characterized planning amendments as quasi-judicial be-
cause, in Colorado, they are merely advisory and passed by resolution. Id. at 306.
166. 239 Va. 484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
167. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va.
97, 106, 49 S.E.2d 321, 325 (1948)).
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then any amendment to it partakes of the same character.168 The
Supreme Court of Virginia failed to recognize, however, the crucial
distinction between the two acts. The comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance's passage is a matter of land use policy affecting all the people in
the jurisdiction. In contrast, a map amendment, reflecting an imple-
mentation policy, affects only the property owner and immediate
neighbors. The United States Supreme Court has recognized such
amendments as the classic definition of nonlegislative acts. 169
In sum, while several recent cases have decided that rezonings are
legislative in character and so referendable, the better argument mili-
tates against such a finding for several reasons. First, rezoning
amounts to the implementation of a policy, usually in connection with
a particular parcel of land with one owner. Thus, it more closely re-
sembles the granting of a permit than the enacting of a general law.
Second, and closely related to the first point, rezonings apply to a small
group of people. Only rarely does much of a legally-cognizable interest
exist, except perhaps that of some neighbors, beyond that of the prop-
erty owner. Third, the courts that have characterized rezonings as leg-
islative appear to be engaging in judicial overreaching in order to
subject zoning to the initiative process. Typically, such courts are lo-
cated in states with a long history of ballot box initiative and referen-
dum measures, and in which their state constitutions reserved to the
people the power of initiative and referendum. Even pro-initiative and
referendum commentators have firmly drawn the line on rezonings,
proffering the Fasano test which makes such rezonings referendum-
proof.' 70
VI. PLANNING AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Most state enabling acts contain detailed procedures for the land re-
zoning, usually heavily laden with planning process and expert evalua-
tion as well as citizen participation through notice and hearings. The
use of initiative or referendum to decide zoning issues circumvent such
elaborate plans and planning processes. Because the land use planning
168. Id. Accord Laird v. City of Danville, 225 Va. 256, 261, 302 S.E.2d 21, 24
(1983).
169. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971).
170. See Freilich & Guemmer, supra note 99. The authors noted that "Since the
Fasano doctrine emerged over a decade ago, it has been clear that the mere application
of zoning to individual parcels should be classified as quasi-judicial or administrative in
nature to which the referendum should not lie." Id. at 514-15.
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and zoning process is a complex one, the use of such procedures and
experts becomes more necessary.171 Despite language to the contrary
in the Eastlake decision, a number of state courts have recognized that
the process of initiative and/or referendum is irreconcilable with plans
and the planning process. This part summarizes these decisions and
those in which the California courts appear to be split on the issue.
The inconsistency of direct democracy with plans and planning was
well-recognized before the Eastlake decision. The Supreme Court of
Utah expressed this sentiment in turning down a request for a referen-
dum on a zoning map change.172 Noting that the municipality in-
volved provided, in effect, a master plan ordinance, the court stated
that zoning by referendum would render the ordinance inoperative.
173
Perhaps the most spirited defense of zoning plans in the face of pop-
ular voting on map amendments came from the New Jersey courts in
Township of Sparta v. Spillane.174 In Spillane, the court explained that
"zoning is intended to be accomplished in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan and should reflect both present and prospective needs of
the community." 175 The court declared that piecemeal attacks on zon-
ing ordinances by referenda would tend to fragment zoning and the
achievement of its broader planning goals without any overriding con-
cept. 176 Because planning boards and governing bodies may not have
always demonstrated the expected expertise in approving amendments,
the court concluded that the concept embodied in the comprehensive
plan should not be discarded.
177
In contrast, the Supreiae Court of Virginia reached the opposite con-
clusion in R. G. Moore Building Corp. v. Committee for Repeal.17 The
court's reasoning, however, is difficult to follow. To the allegation that
rezoning by referendum would be piecemeal and contrary to local com-
prehensive plans, the court indulged in what can only be characterized
171. Goetz, supra note 79, at 822-23.
172. Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
173. Id. See also Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805
(1958) (Supreme Court of Utah upheld dismissal of an initiative petition to rezone land
from commercial to business in part because of the comprehensive plan requirement).
174. 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973).
175. Id. at 525, 312 A.2d at 157. The court stated that zoning decisions showed a
myriad of considerations, including the social, economic and physical characteristics of
the community. Id.
176. Id. at 526, 312 A.2d at 157.
177. Id.
178. 239 Va. 484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
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as judicial sleight of hand. The court held that a referendum acts on
local legislative decisions which are therefore not effective until after
the referendum has upheld or reversed them.17 9 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Court reasoned that "[T]he original zoning on the land-
owner's property remains in place; the landowner is merely prevented
from obtaining a new use for the land in a different zoning classifica-
tion.""8 Further, "IThe referendum provisions can never be used to
rezone property, so the anticipated danger of piecemeal alterations to
the City's comprehensive plan does not exist."1 '
The Supreme Court of Virginia's reasoning at best exalts the barest
of form over substance. There may be better arguments for claiming
that initiatives and referenda can be consistent with comprehensive
planning, but this is clearly not among them. Comprehensive plans are
for the express purpose of ensuring that land use decisions are in ac-
cordance therewith, regardless of what body exercises the zoning
power. Here, it is the people through referendum, and they should be
bound by comprehensive plans even in those states which approve zon-
ing by ballot box.
Even California courts, in which initiative and referenda have fared
best in land use changes despite numerous challenges, have held that
voters by initiative may not create an "internal" inconsistency by
amending a plan so that it is at significant variance with the rest of the
plan when read as a whole.1" 2 Indeed, the California situation is in
considerable flux l" 3 as a result of two recent decisions striking down
initiatives largely on planning grounds. In the first decision, Garat v.
City of Riverside,"8 4 a superior court held two initiatives classifying
property in a residential agricultural zone (5200 acres) invalid on the
179. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 590.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors, 126 Cal. App. 3d 698, 179 Cal. Rptr. 261
(1981). See also Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek, 213 Cal. App. 3d
1287, 262 Cal. Rptr. 337, cert. granted, 49 Cal. 3d 1107, 783 P.2d 184, 264 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1989) (en bane) (holding that a zoning map amendment by referendum would be
inconsistent with the local comprehensive plan, should be treated as a de facto plan map
amendment; and apparently is subject to popular vote); deBottari v. Norco City Coun-
cil, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1985) (an initiative is invalid unless the
land use change accords with the general applicable plan).
183. See generally Curtin & Jacobson, Growth Management by Initiative in Califor-
nia: Legal and Practical Issues, 21 URB. LAW. 491, 496 (1989) (for a discussion of the
shift in California law on initiative).
184. Garat v. City of Riverside, No. 191567.
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ground that the City of Riverside did not have a legally adequate gen-
eral plan as required by California statutes.
In the second, a California appellate court in L.LF.E. Committee v.
City of Lodi 185 held invalid an initiative measure which prevented an
annexation in part because the measure conflicted with state planning
laws.186 In so holding, the court stressed that "the right of local initia-
tive must give way where the issue is one of paramount statewide con-
cern. ' 187 The court noted that state land use planning laws granted
cities legislative power to enact general planning and zoning ordi-
nances. 18 8 Therefore, the court reasoned that a local electorate may
not interfere through initiative with the exercise of this statutorily con-
ferred legislative power. 89 Characterizing the initiative measure in
L.LFE. Committee as the voters' attempt to condition the right of an-
nexation before it commenced, the court found that the scheme inter-
fered with and frustrated state annexation procedures. 9'
The L.LF.E. Committee decision reflects earlier concerns about us-
ing the local initiative process to affect matters of statewide concern.
In Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (COST),191 for ex-
ample, the California Supreme Court struck down a local initiative
which would have required the submission of certain transportation
fees to the voters before they could be imposed. 92 The court found
that the applicable California statutes clearly manifested intent that
185. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1139, 262 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1989).
186. Id. at 1149, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1148, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
189. L.LFE. Comm., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1148-49, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
190. Specifically, the court stated that:
Ferrini [an earlier case] presents the obverse of the annexation coin. There the
voters attempted to overrule a previously approved and completed annexation pro-
cess. Here, the voters of Lodi have attempted to reserve the right to hold annexa-
tion before it can commence. Either scheme interferes with and frustrates state
annexation procedures and cannot be sustained.
State land use planning laws grant legislative power to the city to enact a general
plan and zoning ordinances... The city council may not condition this power by
enacting an ordinance requiring voter approval of such measures. A fortiori neither
may the electorate through the initiative fetter the exercise of the legislative power
conferred by the statutes governing land use....
Id. at 1148-49, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72 (citing Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispo, 150
Cal. App. 3d 239, 246, 197 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1983)).
191. 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754 P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988).
192. Id. at 512, 754 P.2d at 721, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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such funding was a matter of statewide concern.19 3 Consequently, the
court held that the state could, and did, delegate that funding authority
solely to the cities without violating the constitutional reservation of
initiative to the people. 194 In making its determination, the court ex-
plained that in matters of statewide concern, the state may preempt the
entire field to the exclusion of all local control.195 The court further
noted that the state may choose instead to grant some measure of local
control and autonomy.196 In that case, however, the state has author-
ity to impose procedural restrictions which may include barring the
exercise of the initiative and referendum. 197
The COST court made it abundantly clear that the reasoning in the
Associated Home Builders ' 98 and Arnel1 99 cases was wholly inapplica-
ble because those cases dealt with measures which the court viewed as
local rather than regional or statewide in importance."° Furthermore,
the court noted that the legislature in those cases used the term "legis-
lative body" rather than "city council."2 °1 The use of the former, ac-
cording to the court, "is more easily read as including the electorate"
than the latter.2 "2
Both the plans and the process of planning become irrelevant when
land use mapping decisions are made through popular democracy.2 "3
So lamented Justice Clark in dissent in the California case that started
it all, "Because of today's holding that the initiative takes precedence
over zoning laws, the legislative scheme of notice, hearings, agency
consideration, reports, findings and modifications can be by-
193. Id. at 511, 754 P.2d at 720, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
194. Id.
195. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 511, 754 P.2d at 720, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 374.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 557 P.2d
473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Associated Home Builders decision.
199. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1980). See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text for a discussion on
Arnel.
200. Committee of Seven Thousand, 45 Cal. 3d at 504-05, 754 P.2d at 716, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 370.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Goetz, supra note 79, at 822-23.
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passed..., 2" As one commentator has pithily put it, "[P]lanning and
environmental protection are matters of statewide concern. As such,
local initiative action should not be permitted to interfere. ''205
VII. THE RESERVED POWER DOCTRINE: RESERVING THE POWER
OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN A STATE
CONSTITUTION AS A PREREQUISITES To
BALLOT Box ZONING
The reserved power doctrine is based upon the assumption that the
power to govern comes entirely from the people, who can delegate such
powers to their chosen representatives.2"c In delegating their powers,
the people may choose to keep or "reserve" certain powers to act on
issues that may ordinarily be delegated to their legislative body.2 "7 The
United States Supreme Court has placed great importance on the con-
stitutional reservation of initiative and referendum when considering
the validity of initiative and referendum measures.208 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that the absence of standards makes no differ-
ence when the act in question involved a power constitutionally re-
served to the people rather than a delegation of power. 209
204. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 615, 557
P.2d 473, 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 60 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
205. Note, Zoning by Initiative in California, A Critical Analysis, 12 LoY. L.A.L.
REv. 903, 915 (1979).
206. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976)
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison)).
207. Id. at 672-73 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) and James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
208. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672-73 ("To be subject to Ohio's referendum proce-
dure, the question must be one within the scope of the legislative power."); see supra
notes 78-104 (discussing Eastlake and the implications of the constitutional reservation
of initiative and referendum on ballot box zoning).
209. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 675. In Eastlake, the Supreme Court explained:
Assuming, arguendo, their relevance to state governmental functions, these cases
involved a delegation of power by the legislature to regulatory bodies, which are
not directly responsible to the people; this doctrine [requiring standards] is inappli-
cable where, as here, rather than dealing with a delegation of power, we deal with a
power reserved by the people to themselves.
Since the rezoning decision in this case was properly reserved to the people of
Eastlake under the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding
invalid, on federal constitutional grounds, the charter amendment permitting the
voters to decide whether the zoned use of respondent's property could be altered.
Id. at 675, 679 (emphasis added).
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As this part demonstrates, even where a state constitution reserves
the initiative power to the people, many courts reject zoning by initia-
tive. On the other hand, there appears to be only one case in which the
court has upheld the use of initiative and referendum where there was
no constitutional reservation of power. In sum, those courts that have
upheld zoning by initiative and referendum are in states where the con-
stitution has reserved the power; conversely, only one court has ap-
proved of the procedure in states where the constitution has not.
A. Where There is a Constitutional Reservation
Not surprisingly, many jurisdictions uphold ballot box zoning where
the state constitution specifically reserves the power of initiative to the
people. California courts in particular have taken this position. Cali-
fornia amended its constitution in 1911 to reserve the power of initia-
tive and referendum to the people.21 °
In Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore,2 1 ' the
Supreme Court of California held that a zoning ordinance adopted by
initiative was valid. The ordinance prevented the issuance of building
permits until educational, sewage, and water facilities met specified
standards. The state zoning enabling act provided that any ordinance
that changed zoning or imposed land use restrictions could only be
enacted following notice and a hearing before the planning commission
and council.21 2
In making its determination, the court reasoned that statutory notice
and hearing requirements of the zoning ordinance apply only to city
council action, not to action taken by voters in an initiative.2 13 First,
the court explained that there is no conflict between the initiative stat-
ute and zoning statutes.21 4 The legislature never intended the zoning
law's notice and hearing requirements to apply to zoning by initiative
any more than the initiative law requirements apply to the council zon-
ing enactments. Second, although a state statute specifies initiative
procedures, the right itself was constitutionally guaranteed.2 15 Conse-
210. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557
P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976). See Comment, The Scope of the Initiative
and Referendum in California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1717 (1966).
211. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41.
212. Id. at 582, 590-91, 557 P.2d at 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
213. Id. at 596, 557 P.2d at 481, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
214. Id. at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
215. Id. at 594-95, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
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quently, legislative enactments could neither limit nor restrict the exer-
cise of the right.216 The court in Associated Home Builders, therefore,
heavily relied upon the reserved nature of initiative and referendum in
California.
In Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Board of
Supervisors,217 a landowner sought injunctive relief to prevent the
County Board of Supervisors' rezoning of 3840 acres of land from be-
ing submitted to a referendum vote. The Court of Appeals of Arizona
denied the landowner's requested relief, holding that the referendum
was proper.218 The court reasoned that the constitutional reservation
of initiative and referendum established the electorate as a coordinate
source of legislation.219 Like the Associated Home Builders court, the
Arizona court based much of its decision on the constitutional reserva-
tion of the power of initiative and referendum.
Many of the cases upholding initiative and referendum in states with
a constitutional reservation of the power have distinguished legislative
from administrative acts. For instance, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in Margolis v. District Court,220 decided that zoning and rezoning
are legislative acts, and are thus subject to initiative and referendum
constitutionally reserved to the people.221
The Margolis court characterized initiative and referendum as fun-
damental rights of a republican form of government the people have
reserved for themselves.222 The court reasoned, therefore, that reserva-
tion of power should be liberally construed in favor of the right to exer-
cise it.2 23 Because initiative and referendum are direct checks on
elected officials' legislative actions, the constitutionally reserved powers
apply only to acts of the city council which are legislative in charac-
ter.224 Thus, even though the power of initiative and referendum may
be reserved in the state's constitution, it must be applied to a legislative
216. Id.
217. 108 Ariz. 449, 501 P.2d 391 (1972).
218. Id. at 450, 501 P.2d at 392.
219. Id. at 451, 501 P.2d at 393 (citing Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P.2d 1114
(1913)).
220. 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
221. Id. at 304.
222. Id. at 302 (citing Bernzen v. City of Boulder, 186 Colo. 81, 87, 525 P.2d 416,
419 (1974)).
223. Id. (citing Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 450 P.2d 653 (1969)).
224. Margolis, 638 P.2d at 302-03.
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act to be valid.225
Courts in other jurisdictions have come to similar conclusions. In
Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs,226 the court held that a
referendum vote on an ordinance that would rezone and affect a partic-
ular tract of land would not violate the owner's due process rights and
that the city ordinance changing the zoning was a legislative act subject
to referendum.227
In addressing a due process challenge to the referendum vote,228 the
court first held that because the referenda is a reserved power, certain
discernible standards do not apply, as they would with "delegated"
powers. 229 Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Eastlake, the court concluded that the referendum did not violate due
process.23° Finally, the court held that the zoning change was a legis-
lative act subject to referendum.23 x
B. Ballot Box Zoning Illegal Despite a Constitutional Reservation
Even in states constitutionally reserving the power of initiative and
referendum to the people, many courts have struck down zoning by
initiative and referendum.
In Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. City of Tucson,232 the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held that a city or county zoning ordinance may
not be amended by initiative.233 The Transamerica court distinguished
an initiative from a referendum,2 34 and reaffirmed its prior decision in
225. Id. at 302. "We held that a rezoning ordinance passed by the city council was
subject to the referendum provisions of the Fort Collins City Charter." Id. (citing City
of Fort Collins v. Dooney, 178 Colo. 25, 27-28, 496 P.2d 316, 317-18 (1972)). "In
Zwerdlinger we held that the Colorado Constitution, art. V, § 1, reserved the powers of
referendum and initiative 'only to acts which are legislative in character.'" Id. (citing
City of Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 194 Colo. 192, 196, 571 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1977)).
226. 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983).
227. Id. at 174.
228. Id. at 173. (The plaintiff argued that it had been deprived of its right to proper
notice and its right to be heard). Id. at 172.
229. Id. at 174, (citing City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 426 U.S.
668, 679 (1976)).
230. Id. at 174.
231. Id. See also City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla.
1972) (zoning code amendment changing zoning on specific property held to be legisla-
tive instead of quasi-judicial, and thus subject to referendum).
232. 157 Ariz. 346, 757 P.2d 1055 (1988) (en banc).
233. Id. at 349-50, 757 P.2d at 1058-59.
234. Id. at 349, n.6, 757 P.2d at 1058 n.6 ("[referendum] does not change zoning as
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City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court,23 5 which held that initiative con-
flicts with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution.236 Furthermore, the court held that initia-
tive violated the state zoning enabling act's provisions delegating zon-
ing powers to the governing body of the city and requiring notice and
hearing before zoning regulations are adopted.237
The Supreme Court of Nevada employed similar reasoning in For-
man v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets.238 In Thrifty Drugs, the court
found the planning commission and city council's actions administra-
tive and not subject to initiative and referendum2 39 when a zoning pol-
icy has been determined, and the task of changing zoning areas or the
granting of exceptions has been given. Likewise, the Supreme Court of
Ohio in State ex rel. Srovnal v. Linton,2"° held that a city council reso-
lution confirming the planning and zoning commission's grant of a
zoning use exception represented an administrative act, and, therefore,
was not subject to referendum. 4'
Some courts have found initiative or referendum inapplicable when
the process would have conflicted with state statutes.242 In Gumprecht
v. City of Coeur D'Alene,243 for example, the Supreme Court of Idaho
held that the initiative could not be exercised for zoning decisions be-
cause it was inconsistent with the zoning law's procedural require-
ments.2' In so holding, the court found that the legislature delegated
the authority to enact comprehensive plans, establish zoning districts
and adopt amendatory ordinances exclusively to city and county legis-
lative or governing bodies. 24 5 The court further found that the legisla-
ture granted the authority pursuant to specific prescribed
an initiative would, and the notice and hearing process has been accomplished prior to
the referendum").
235. 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968) (en banc).
236. Id. at 207-08, 439 P.2d at 293-94.
237. Transamerica, 157 Ariz. at 348, 757 P.2d at 1057.
238. 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1974).
239. Id. at 537-38, 516 P.2d at 1237.
240. 46 Ohio St. 2d 207, 346 N.E.2d 764 (1976).
241. Id. at 213, 346 N.E.2d at 768.
242. See Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754 P.2d
708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988).
243. 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983).
244. Id. at 618-19, 661 P.2d at 1217-18.
245. Id. at 618, 661 P.2d at 1217.
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procedures. 246 Thus, the court concluded that "the comprehensiveness
of zoning legislation in Idaho leaves no room for direct legislation by
electors through an initiative election."247 Accordingly, initiative or
referendum may not always be judicially permitted in rezonings even
where there is a constitutional reservation of the power.
C. Ballot Box Zoning Without a Constitutional Reservation
Research has revealed only one case in which a court upheld the use
of initiative or referendum in land use decision-making when its consti-
tution did not reserve the power, but when a charter reserved it. In
Denny v. City of Duluth,248 the Supreme Court of Minnesota used a
referendum power reserved in the city's charter to enjoin the city from
issuing building permits in a recently rezoned area until the zoning
amendment was submitted for a referendum vote. 249 The court held
that zoning amendments are legislative in character and therefore sub-
ject to referendum.250 The court reasoned that the City Council was
under a statutory duty to amend boundaries of residential zone by ordi-
nance and that adopting an ordinance is legislative in character.251
Courts, however, are most likely to disapprove of the use of initiative
or referendum in states where the power has not been reserved in the
constitution. For instance, the Superior Court of New Jersey in Smith
v. Township of Livingston,252 held that a zoning amendment may not be
enacted by initiative process. The court reasoned that when there is
conflict between a general statute and a specific statute which covers
the subject more minutely and definitely, the more specific statute will
246. Id.
247. Id. at 618, 661 P.2d at 1217. Accord Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737,
202 N.W.2d 803 (1972); State ex reL Powers v. Donahue, 368 S.W.2d 432, 439 (Mo.
1963) (en banc); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah. 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805
(1954); Lince v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wash. App. 309, 607 P.2d 329 (1980).
248. 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972). Arguably, there is a second case, R.G.
Moore Co. v. Committee for Repeal, 239 Va. 484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990), but the court
there found the initiative and referendum power had been generally reserved to the
people, even absent specific language.
249. Denny, 295 Minn. at 26, 202 N.W.2d at 894.
250. Id. at 28-29, 202 N.W.2d at 895-96.
251. Id. at 29, 202 N.W.2d at 896. But cf. San Pedro North v. City of San Antonio,
562 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that a zoning ordinance was not subject
to initiative and referendum provisions of the city's charter because the initiative vote
would have added a procedural step not required in the state Zoning Enabling Act).
252. 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85, aff'd, 54 N.J. 525, 257 A.2d 698 (1969).
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prevail over the former and will be considered an exception to the gen-
eral statute.253 The Zoning Act was specific, while the initiative and
referendum provisions of the Faulkner Act did not mention zoning at
all.2
54
Furthermore, the Smith court found that the "right to referendum
and initiative in municipal affairs is strictly a statutory and not a consti-
tutional right. 255 The court reasoned that the "Zoning Act... consti-
tutes an exclusive grant of legislative power to the governing bodies of
the respective municipalities preventing the voters from exercising
power of initiative., 256
The Court of Appeals of New York in Elkind v. City of New
Rochelle 257 held a section in the city charter permitting a referendum
on zoning amendments invalid.258 The court explained that the city
was established by the City Home Rule Law.25 9 Because this law ex-
pressly states when mandatory and permissive referenda must and may
be executed, it precludes the city from granting any authority to allow
zoning or rezoning by referendum. 2 °
In sum, the reservation of the initiative and referendum powers in a
state constitution is critical to a judicial finding that making land deci-
sions by initiative or referendum is proper. Courts usually strike down
initiative and referendum in states where the power was not reserved in
the state constitution. Generally, constitutional reservation of the initi-
ative or referendum power is essential to upholding their use for reclas-
sifying property.
VIII. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND DISCRIMINATION
One of the most potentially troublesome problems with initiative and
253. Id. at 451, 256 A.2d at 89.
254. Id. at 452, 256 A.2d at 89.
255. Id. at 453, 256 A.2d at 89 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 457, 256 A.2d at 91. See also Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J.
Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973). In Spillane, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appel-
late Division, held that the referendum provisions of the Faulkner Act do not apply to
zoning amendments of the municipality, because "essentially the same considerations
which bar application of the initiative process to zoning ordinance amendments apply in
the case of the referendum." Id. at 525, 312 A.2d at 157.
257. 5 N.Y.2d 836, 155 N.E.2d 404, 181 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
258. Id. at 837, 155 N.E.2d at 405, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
259. Id. at 837, 155 N.E.2d at 404, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
260. Id.
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referendum is their tendency to dilute minority rights whether or not
direct discrimination is intended. As Madison wrote in a letter to
Thomas Jefferson during the debates on the United States Constitution,
"measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice,
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an inter-
ested and overbearing majority."2 6 '
Unfortunately, the examples of majoritarian tyranny of this sort are
manifold. Referenda have been used to repeal local-government passed
fair housing ordinances and initiatives to pass alien land laws.262 Ini-
tiatives have declared English the official language, banned funds for
poor women seeking abortions, and authorized involuntary AIDS testi-
mony for assailants of police and emergency workers.263 Perhaps the
issue is best put by Professor Derek Bell in his seminal article on the
subject. "Appeals to prejudice, oversimplification of the issues, and ex-
ploitation of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to
complex problems often characterize referendum and initiative cam-
paigns. ' " As Bell observed, politicians in office may do much the
same thing - but we can vote them out of office. Moreover, even if
they do not become models of well-informed representatives, at least
the checks and balances of the political process will curtail their worst
excesses. Politicians, even prejudiced ones, do not wish to publicly ad-
vocate racism or attribute such sentiments to their constituents. The
representative system can translate intensity of interest into minority
victories. An active group can easily win over a politician as against an
apathetic or mildly opposed majority. That is not so with voters in the
privacy of the voting booth, who are able to vote their prejudices with
impunity.265 No accommodation exists in the direct democratic pro-
261. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 16 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1966).
Madison further wrote:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression.
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Govern-
ment contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the govern-
ment is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.
Id. See generally Elfenbein, The Mytho of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy,
71 IOWA L. REv. 401, 473 (1986).
262. See generally Comment, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and
Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 733 (1988).
263. See Eule, supra note 6, at 1551.
264. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 19-20 (1978).
265. Id. at 14.
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cess exemplified by initiative and referendum.266
Other problems arise with direct democracy and minority rights. In
a seminal article suggesting heightened judicial scrutiny of most initia-
tives and referenda, Julian Eule cites persuasive authority for the prop-
osition that the initiative is unduly insensitive to minority rights.
Noting that "racism, sexism, nativism, and self-interest are too much a
part of American history to be ignored,, 2 67 Eule observes that results
of substantive plebiscites in 1988 worked hardships on minorities of
every stripe, whether economic, ethnic or sexual.2 68 Comparing legis-
lative lawmaking with direct democracy, Eule concludes that the truly
pernicious nature of direct democracy results from its purposeful mea-
suring of naked, aggregated preferences of a majority. This result, by
definition, works against minorities. 269
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has sufficiently ex-
266. Accommodation is a norm of importance to the successful operation of a
legislature as well as to that of a political system generally. Subjecting an unlimited
array of issues to popular vote has the detrimental effect of intensifying preexisting
differences. By their nature, referendum campaigns appeal to passions and
prejudices, spotlight tensions, and result only in greater conflict and disagreement.
The most notable example of an area in which referendums have had this effect is
that of race relations.
D. MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 185. One commentator has noted:
[c]ompared with voters generally, people who typically vote on propositions are
disproportionately well-educated, affluent, and white. Minorities, the poor, and the
uneducated are thus doubly underrepresented in the plebiscite. They are both less
likely to turn out and less likely to vote on propositions [compared to candidates] if
they do.
Eule, supra note 6, at 1515 (footnote omitted).
267. Eule, supra note 6, at 1553.
268. America's "outsiders" cannot have felt sanguine over the results of substan-
tive plebiscites in November, 1988. Initiatives declared English the official lan-
guage in Arizona, Colorado, and Florida. Voters in Arkansas, Colorado, and
Michigan banned funding for poor women seeking abortions. California voters au-
thorized involuntary AIDS testing for sex crime suspects and for assailants of po-
lice and emergency workers. And, in Oregon, an initiative repealed the Governor's
executive order banning discrimination against lesbians and gay men in the execu-
tive branch.
Eule, supra note 6, at 1551 & n.211 (citing 9 INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM REPORT
No. 10 (Dec. 1988) and INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE
(Winter 1989)).
269. Specifically, Eule argues:
The problem with substitutive democracy is different. When naked preferences
emerge from a plebiscite, it is not a consequence of a system breakdown. Naked
preferences are precisely what the system seeks to measure. Aggregation is all that
it cares about. The threat to minority rights and interests here is structural. This is
how the system is supposed to work.
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alted direct democracy through the referendum process so as to ignore
such problems. Although it was City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc. that upheld direct democracy through referendum on a re-
zoning,270 the seeds were sown earlier in Justice Black's opinion in
James v. Valtierra 271 As discussed in Part IV, the Eastlake Court was
also impressed with this benign version of direct democracy and chose
to ignore the exclusionary aspect of the rezoning in that case.272
IX. CONCLUSION
There is little legal basis for rezoning by initiative and referendum.
Rezoning by initiative and referendum bypasses statutory (or charter)
notice, review and hearing requirements so as to impermissibly violate
these statutory requirements and deprive a property owner of property
without due process of law. Courts in other jurisdictions have so held,
even after the United States Supreme Court decision in the Eastlake
case. In fact, Eastlake addressed only a "delegation of authority" issue
which does not arise in those states where the state constitution does
not reserve initiative and referendum to the people. Most decisions
approving rezoning by popular vote are from states which do reserve
the power to the people. In some of these jurisdictions, however,
Eule, supra note 6, at 1551 (footnotes omitted).
Eule correctly emphasizes that even with their faults, legislatures represent the most
rational, careful, considered, and politic place to enact laws, as compared to the uncon-
sidered, often misinformed aggregation of numbers characterizing legislation by ballot
box. Accordingly, courts should examine such legislation with heightened, rather than
diminished scrutiny because of the potential adverse effects on minority rights. Eule
continues to advocate heightened judicial scrutiny based upon other legal and policy
arguments. While I subscribe to most of these, they are by and large tangential to the
legal arguments in this analysis which mitigate strongly against the initiative and refer-
endum in rezoning issues. See D. MAGLEBY, SUPRA note 11 (promoting heightened
judicial scrutiny of initiative and referendum measures).
270. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
271. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In Valtierra, Justice Black stated:
Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, dis-
crimination or prejudice... The people of California have also decided by their
own vote to require referendum approval of low-rent public housing projects. This
procedure ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision
which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased
public services and to lower tax revenues. It gives them a voice in decision that will
affect the future development of their own community.
Id. at 141-43.
272. See Goetz, supra note 79, at 815-16.
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courts have held that such a general reserved power must give way to
statutory processes of affecting property through zoning and rezoning.
Constitutional due process of a procedural nature is generally not
accorded to those whose property is affected by a truly legislative deci-
sion. Nonetheless, statutory procedures, as noted above, may still ap-
ply. This disparity raises the fundamental question of whether
rezoning is a legislative (referendable) act, or a quasi-judi-
cial/administrative (non-referendable) act. If characterized as legisla-
tive, then it is not only referendable, but also free of constitutional due
process requirements. An act is legislative if it is an expression of gen-
eral policy applicable to the people as a whole in a particular jurisdic-
tion. It is administrative or quasi-judicial if it represents the
implementation of a policy, affecting only part of the people in a juris-
diction and directed at them; in the land use context, if it affects a
particular parcel of land rather than many parcels classified in a partic-
ular category or zone. Thus, for example, the addition of a new zoning
category or district would clearly represent a legislative act. Granting
a variance or special use permit to an individual property owner would
not.27 On balance, does reclassifying a particular piece of property
more closely resemble the granting of a permit or the creation of a new
and generally applicable zoning category? Surely the answer cannot be
made to depend upon whether the body exercising the function is a
legislative body or not. On balance, rezoning most closely resembles
the permitting process, and so should be classified as a quasi-judicial or
administrative act. As such, it is both subject to at least state proce-
dural due process requirements and is not referendable.
273. An exception to much of the above is the state of California. Even there, the
courts are growing wary of the use of initiative and referendum when the subject matter
is devoid of certain planning processes or is of statewide (including regional) concern.
California courts have by and large approved zoning by initiative, holding that statutory
notice, hearing and expert review otherwise required of a local legislative body are inap-
plicable to the initiative process. The same courts have also held that rezoning is a
legislative and not a quasi-judicial act. However, both these holdings rest at bottom on
the reservation of the initiative and referendum power to the people and the vigorous
defense of that reservation in all matters put to popular vote by the courts, the legisla-
ture and the constitutional process that amended the constitution to reserve the powers
in 1911.
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